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Abstract
The interaction between habit formation and pollution-type ex-
ternalities modi￿es the social optimum through discount e⁄ects and
elasticity e⁄ects. If the substitution elasticity does not exceed unity,
both e⁄ects reduce optimal consumption and capital in the long run,
and the optimal capital-income tax increases with the relative impor-
tance of habits. Similar results hold with high elasticity if the relative
importance of habits is su¢ ciently high.
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11. Introduction
There is a general consensus on the importance of habits in consumer
behavior. At the theoretical level, the idea that private utility depends on
relative, rather than on absolute consumption levels, is receiving consider-
able attention in the recent literature on economic growth. Models with
habit formation - also labeled as ￿ internal habits￿ , or ￿ inward￿ looking prefer-
ences￿- assume that agents compare current consumption with a weighted
average of own past consumption levels. In a seminal paper, Ryder and
Heal (1973) showed that internal habits a⁄ect transitional dynamics, but
do not modify the long-run equilibrium in the neoclassical growth model,
characterized by a steady-state capital stock corresponding to the standard
modi￿ed golden rule. That is, in a world with constant returns to scale and
complete markets, habit formation per se does not matter in the long run.
More recent literature, however, suggests that habit-induced deviations arise
in more general contexts: internal habits a⁄ect long-run equilibria when
production possibilities are improved by virtue of exogenous productivity
growth (Alvarez-Cuadrado et al. 2004) or increasing returns (Carrol et al.
1997); moreover, inward-looking behavior may interact with status-seeking,
so that optimal allocations are modi￿ed by consumption externalities with
outward-looking behavior - the so-called ￿ Catching-Up with the Joneses￿fea-
ture (Alonso-Carrera et al. 2005).1
A question that naturally arises is whether habits interact with other
types of externalities, and in which direction socially optimal equilibria devi-
ate by virtue of time-dependent preferences. In particular, negative pollution
externalities stemming from economic activity heavily a⁄ect private welfare,
and are widely recognized as crucial issues for today￿ s policymakers. In this
regard, two contributions by Wendner (2000) and Ono (2002) considered
possible interactions between environmental externalities and habit forma-
tion in a general equilibrium setting. Wendner (2000) points out that habits
may reverse the e⁄ects of conventional environmental policies when envi-
ronmental quality is harmed by production. Ono (2002) shows that habits
have both positive and negative e⁄ects on environmental quality, assuming
that consumption is harmful for the environment. This paper di⁄ers from
these analyses in major ways. At the formal level, Wendner (2000) and Ono
(2002) use an overlapping generations model: in this setting, habits modify
1Carrol et al. (1997) and Alvarez-Cuadrado et al. (2004) mix inward-looking with
outward-looking preferences: in this framework, individuals compare current consumption
not only with their own past history, but also with lagged cross-sectional average consump-
tion in the economy. Alonso-Carrera et al. (2005) show that outward-looking preferences
determine deviations from the habit-free socially optimal allocation.
2the long-run competitive equilibrium in a decentralized economy (Wendner,
2002; Abel, 2005), contrary to the Ramsey-Cass-Koopmans framework with
in￿nitely-lived agents employed here (Alvarez-Cuadrado et al. 2004).2 At
the conceptual level, Wendner (2000) and Ono (2002) focus on competitive
decentralized equilibria, and investigate the consequences of habit-induced
deviations for environmental quality. This paper studies whether, and to
what extent, habits modify socially optimal levels of consumption and cap-
ital by interacting with pollution externalities. An immediate implication
of this interaction is that habits modify the optimal tax rate on capital in-
come which implements the social optimum in a decentralized competitive
equilibrium.
2. The model
The habit stock h of each agent equals the weighted average of her own
past consumption levels. Following Alvarez-Cuadrado et al. (2004), the
dynamic law of h is given by
_ h = ￿(c ￿ h); (1)
where c is individual consumption, and ￿ > 0 is the adjustment speed. In-
stantaneous individual utility is







￿1 ￿ d(e); (2)
where e are pollutant emissions per capita, and the emission-disutility func-
tion is d(e) = e! with ! ￿ 1. Parameter ￿ 2 (0;1) represents the rela-
tive importance of the habit stock, and setting ￿ = 0 rules out habit for-
mation. The instantaneous elasticity " is strictly positive. As " ! 1, in-
stantaneous preferences v (c;h;e) become separable between c and h, since
u(c;h) ! logc ￿ ￿ logh. Aggregate output is represented by the linearly
homogeneous function F (K;L), concave, twice di⁄erentiable, and satisfying
Inada conditions. Labor L is supplied inelastically and normalized to unity,
so that output per worker equals y = f (k), with fk > 0, fkk < 0. The
aggregate resource constraint is
_ k = f (k) ￿ c: (3)
Emissions are linear in output levels: e =  y, with   > 0 constant. Con-
sider a command optimum problem where a benevolent social planner is able
2Another di⁄erence is that we specify habits in the multiplicative form (Carrol, 2000)
instead of the subtractive form used by Wendner (2000) and Ono (2002), which may
generally have quite di⁄erent implications (see Wendner, 2003).
3to observe pollution externalities, and therefore to implement the socially





subject to (1) and (3), with e =  f (k) and k (0) taken as given. The







k (￿ ￿ fk) + de fk; (5)
_ ￿
h = ￿
h (￿ + ￿) ￿ uh; (6)
where ￿k and ￿h represent social marginal shadow values of k and h. De￿ning
￿ = ￿h=￿k, the equilibrium path is described by the four-by-four dynamic
system formed by (1), (3) and



































We now characterize the long-run equilibrium, implicitly assuming that pa-
rameter values are compatible with dynamic stability conditions.3 Setting
_ ￿k = 0 in (5) yields
fk ￿ ￿ = de fk=￿
k: (9)
Condition (9) di⁄ers from the decentralized-equilibrium condition holding
in the same economy when emissions are beyond the agents￿control: in
this case, we would obtain the Ryder and Heal (1973) model, where the
steady-state equilibrium corresponds to the standard modi￿ed golden rule
fk = ￿. From (9), social optimality requires instead fk > ￿ in the long
run: not surprisingly, due to the presence of negative production spillovers,
3To have dynamic stability, it is su¢ cient to assume that parameters satisfy the con-
ditions as in Alvarez-Cuadrado et al. (2004). This is because, for ￿ su¢ ciently low, the
emission-augmented steady-state (9) is stable if the pollution-free equilibrium (fk = ￿) is
stable. As shown by Alvarez-Cuadrado et al. (2004), explicit dynamic stability conditions
are intractable under neoclassical production functions, and cyclical convergence may arise
even under simple Cobb-Douglas technology y = k￿. Being restricted to steady-state con-
siderations, our results do not depend on whether the economy converges monotonically
or cyclically to the steady state.
4the socially optimal level of capital is lower than that corresponding to the
modi￿ed golden rule. More interestingly, habits induce a wedge between
the marginal shadow-value of capital and the marginal utility from current
consumption: setting _ ￿h = 0 in (6) we have ￿h (￿ + ￿) = uh = ￿￿uc, which
from (4) yields
￿
k = uc (￿ + ￿ ￿ ￿￿)(￿ + ￿)
￿1 : (10)
In (10), the wedge between ￿k and uc is exclusively due to habits (￿ =
0 yields ￿k = uc): this is the ￿rst channel through which habits mod-
ify the long-run equilibrium, the habit-discount e⁄ect. The second channel
is the consumption-elasticity e⁄ect: substituting steady-state levels uc =
c￿["+￿(1￿")] and de = ! 
!￿1f (k)
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where c￿ is used to denote the locus _ c = 0. The consumption-elasticity ef-
fect is represented by the long-run elasticity of substitution [" + ￿ (1 ￿ ")]
￿1,
which depends on ￿ as long as " di⁄ers from unity. The role of the habit-
discount e⁄ect is peculiar to this model, since it derives from the interaction
between habits and pollution externalities: the wedge between uc and ￿k
a⁄ects the long-run equilibrium because c￿ is decreasing in the (c;k) plane
due to pollution disutility4. Di⁄erently from the Ramsey model, where _ c = 0
corresponds to a unique level of capital, stationary consumption is here asso-
ciated with a continuum of values of ￿k. As a consequence, the equilibrium
_ c = _ k = 0 depends on ￿k=uc, which is in turn a linear function of ￿. In Fig-
ure 1.(a), the socially optimal equilibrium (css;kss) is represented by point
S, lying at the intersection between c￿ and the locus for steady-state capital,
k￿ =






A ￿rst result regards the existence of long-run e⁄ects of habit formation.
Inspection of (11) reveals that habits modify the long-run equilibrium even if
u(c;h) is separable between c and h. As " ! 1 the elasticity e⁄ect vanishes,
but the habit-discount e⁄ect still occurs, implying
Proposition 1 Habits modify css and kss for any " R 1.








=@k = ￿fkk ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)(! ￿ 1)f2
kf (k)
￿1 ;
which is surely negative for any ￿ < 1.
5Proposition 1 implies that pollution-type externalities modify a typical
result of Ramsey-type models, i.e. that long-run e⁄ects of habit formation
crucially hinge on non-separability (" 6= 1) between current and benchmark
consumption (Alvarez-Cuadrado et al. 2004; Carrol et al. 1997). Since
production externalities release habit-discount e⁄ects, ￿ modi￿es (css;kss)
even if " = 1. A second result relates to the direction of the long-run e⁄ects
of habit formation. The locus _ k = 0 does not depend on ￿, and is increasing
in the (c;k) plane. Consequently, equilibrium capital kss will move in the
same direction as the _ c = 0 locus, in response to a marginal increase in ￿:
sign dkss=d￿ = sign @c
￿=@￿: (12)
From (11), the sign of @c￿=@￿ depends on the relative strength of habit-
discount and elasticity e⁄ects. The discount e⁄ect is always negative, i.e. it
tends to reduce css and kss. The direction of the elasticity e⁄ect, instead,
depends on whether " is greater or less than unity: if " > 1 (" < 1), a higher
importance of habits tends to increase (reduce) the long-run capital stock
through the elasticity e⁄ect. Consequently,
Proposition 2 If " ￿ 1, an increase in ￿ reduces css and kss. If " > 1, the
e⁄ect of ￿ on (css;kss) is a priori ambiguous.
Proposition 2 is proved by di⁄erentiating (11), which implies that the
sign @c￿=@￿ is the same as that of
log
"
(fk ￿ ￿)f (k)
1￿! (￿ + ￿ ￿ ￿￿)
fk! 




(fk ￿ ￿)f (k)
1￿! ￿
fk! 
! [" + ￿ (1 ￿ ")]
;
which is surely negative for " ￿ 1. If " > 1, which is empirically plausible5,
the sign of @c￿=@￿ is a priori unknown, and comparative statics exercises
yield dkss=d￿ > 0 or dkss=d￿ < 0, according to di⁄erent combinations of
parameters. Numerical substitutions suggest that elasticity e⁄ects tend to
dominate for low values of ￿, whereas habit discount e⁄ects are stronger for
high values of ￿. Examples of these hump-shaped reactions to ￿ are depicted
in Figure 1.(b). In numerical terms, Table 1 reports long-run values for
interest rates rss = f0 (kss) in the social optimum: for " = 2:5, the elasticity
5Alvarez-Cuadrado et al. (2004) set " > 1 in order to have a long-run elasticity of
substitution exceeding the constant elasticity obtained under time-separable preferences,
consistent with available evidence. Alonso-Carrera et al. (2005) also suggest imposing
" > 1 in order to rule out a priori possible corner solutions in the dynamic optimization
problem.
6e⁄ect (which reduces rss by increasing kss) dominates for ￿ . 0:65, whereas
discount e⁄ects dominate for ￿ & 0:65. Since " = 2:5 is a relatively high
value and ￿ > 0:65 is empirically plausible (Fuhrer, 2000), discount e⁄ects
likely dominate even with " > 1. That is, an increase in ￿ reduces css and
kss if either " ￿ 1, or " > 1 with ￿ su¢ ciently high. Table 1 also con￿rms
unambiguous e⁄ects in the separable case " = 1: long-run interest rates
increase with ￿. In this regard, Proposition 2 implies the following
Corollary 3 If " ￿ 1, the optimal capital-income tax implementing (css;kss)
in a decentralized economy increases with ￿.
This result is easily proved as follows. Taxing capital incomes at rate
￿ in a decentralized economy implies limt!1 k (t) = kde, where kde is the
unique level of capital satisfying the distorted equilibrium condition f0 (kde) =
￿ (1 ￿ ￿)
￿1. In order to implement the socially-optimal allocation, a policy-
maker would therefore set ￿ equal to the optimal tax rate
￿
￿
ss = 1 ￿ (￿=f
0 (kss)) (13)
in the long run. From Proposition 2, " ￿ 1 implies df0 (kss)=d￿ > 0, which
from (13) implies d￿￿=d￿ > 0. It also follows from the above discussion that
d￿￿=d￿ > 0 even with " > 1, provided ￿ is su¢ ciently high. The last row in
Table 1 suggests that the impact of habits on ￿￿ may be substantial: in the
separable case " = 1, the optimal tax rate on capital income with ￿ = 0:8,
which is the value of ￿ estimated by Fuhrer (2000), equals ￿￿
ss = 3:53%, that is
more than two times the value obtained when ruling out habits (￿￿
ss = 1:53%
with ￿ = 0).
3. Concluding Remarks
This paper investigated the interaction between habit formation and neg-
ative externalities from production, and its consequences for the socially opti-
mal equilibrium in the Ramsey-Cass-Koopmans model. We have shown that
externalities modify the long-run equilibrium through a peculiar discount ef-
fect, in addition to the elasticity e⁄ect. As a consequence, habit-induced
deviations arise even if utility is separable between current and benchmark
consumption. In most cases, the overall e⁄ect of habits is to reduce socially
optimal levels of consumption and capital, implying that the optimal capital-
income tax increases with the relative importance of the habit stock.
With respect to previous literature, our results suggest the following re-
marks. First, in the representative agent framework with in￿nite lifetime,
most recent contributions show that (i) the existence of long-run e⁄ects of
7habits crucially hinges on non-separability between current and benchmark
consumption, and (ii) the direction of long-run e⁄ects of habits is unam-
biguously determined by the elasticity of substitution.6 In this regard, we
have shown that (i) separability does not exclude habit-induced equilibria,
because of the peculiar discount e⁄ect generated by pollution externalities,
and (ii) that the direction of habit-induced deviations is crucially determined
by the intensity of such discount e⁄ects. Second, with respect to Wendner
(2000) and Ono (2002), the logic of the present analysis is driven by fun-
damental di⁄erences in paradigms: in our model, the decentralized long-run
equilibrium does not deviate from the modi￿ed golden rule, whereas, in the
overlapping generations framework, consumption in the competitive equilib-
rium is a⁄ected by habits. As a consequence, the long-run e⁄ects discussed
here represent habit-induced deviations in socially-optimal levels of consump-
tion and capital, given that private agents would follow the modi￿ed golden
rule in a decentralized setting. Viceversa, Wendner (2000) and Ono (2002)
analyze the deviations induced by habits in private behavior, and the result-
ing consequences for environmental quality in the decentralized equilibrium.
One implication of this di⁄erent logic is the apparent contradiction with the
result of Ono (2002), who shows that habit formation has positive (ambigu-
ous) e⁄ects on environmental quality for " > 1 (" ￿ 1). On the one hand, this
result can be explained in terms of di⁄erent assumptions about preferences,
environmental quality, and the nature of spillovers, which imply a di⁄erent
role of the intertemporal elasticity of substitution in Ono (2002).7 On the
other hand, the contrast between this result and our Proposition 2 is only
apparent, since the Proposition 2 refers to the socially optimal allocation,
and not to the decentralized equilibrium. In a similar vein of comparison,
with respect to Wendner (2000), the present model was suitable to derive
habit-induced deviations in the optimal level of capital income tax rates,
shifting the focus away from two-sided interactions between environmental
policies and habits in a decentralized setting. This last issue is an interesting
topic which may deserve, in parallel, further analysis in the more appropriate
Diamond-Samuelson framework.
6Alvarez-Cuadrado et al. (2004) ￿nd long-run ￿ elasticity e⁄ects￿ by extending the
Ramsey model to include exogenous productivity growth, but these e⁄ects require non-
separability to take place; similarly, long-run balanced growth in the AK model is a⁄ected
by habits if and only if " 6= 1 (Carrol et al. 1997).
7In Ono (2002), environmental quality: (i) is an intergenerational externality which
accumulates over time, (ii) a⁄ects only second-period utility, and (iii) is negatively a⁄ected
by consumption, instead of production. In this setting, " indicates willingness to substitute
￿rst-period consumption with second-period bene￿ts in terms of both consumption and
environmental quality: with " > 1, habits reduce the negative e⁄ects of second-period
consumption on environmental quality.
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9Figure 1. Graph (a): the _ c = 0 locus is decreasing, and kss is lower
with respect to the decentralized equilibrium (fk = ￿). Graph (b): the
_ c = 0 locus for di⁄erent values of ￿ (￿i = 0:9, ￿ii = 0:7, ￿iii = 0:5,
￿iv = 0:3, ￿v = 0:1). In this case, deviations in (css, kss) are generally
ambiguous (parameter values are the same as in Table 1, with " = 2:5).
￿ 0:0 0:2 0:4 0:6 0:8
rss (" = 2:5) 4:22% 4:20% 4:19% 4:18% 4:19%
rss (" = 1:0) 4:06% 4:07% 4:09% 4:11% 4:15%
￿￿
ss (" = 2:5) 5:28% 4:81% 4:50% 4:37% 4:52%
￿￿
ss (" = 1:0) 1:53% 1:79% 2:14% 2:67% 3:53%
Table 1. Long-run interest rates in the socially-optimal equilibrium
and optimal tax rates on capital for di⁄erent values of ￿ and ". Para-
meter values are ! = 1:5,   = 0:02, ￿ = 0:04, ￿ = 0:3, ￿ = 0:1.
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